When a worker is o¤ered performance related pay, the incentive e¤ect is not only determined by the shape of the incentive contract, but also by the probability of contract enforcement. We show that weaker enforcement may reduce the worker's e¤ort, but lead to higherpowered incentive contracts. This creates a seemingly negative relationship between e¤ort and performance pay.
Introduction
Standard economic models predict a positive relationship between e¤ort and performance pay. In contrast, there is a range of sociological and psychological studies that focus on all the problems that performance pay creates. Some studies even suggest that performance pay can be detrimental to e¤ort (see Jenkins, Gupta, Mitra and Shaw, 1998, for an overview). The negative e¤ects of so-called New Public Management (NPM) are often emphasized. NPM describes reforms in the public sector that are characterized by an emphasis on output control, performance related pay and introduction of market mechanisms. Scholars argue that NPM undermines -or crowd outintrinsic motivation and thus the e¤ort of public servants, see e.g. Weibel, Rost, Osterloh (2010), and Perry, Engbers and Jun (2009).
This incentive puzzle has gained inquisitive interest from economic theorists. The common denominator of the di¤erent theoretical approaches is that non-monetary motivation is treated as a variable as opposed to a …xed attribute. 1 Standard economic theory acknowledges that agents have nonmonetary motivation, but it is treated as a …xed entity. Once non-monetary motivation is allowed to vary, higher monetary rewards may reduce nonmonetary motivation to such an extent that e¤ort is reduced. In this paper we show that variations in enforcement probability can have similar e¤ects as variations in intrinsic motivation, and we argue that the former can be an alternative explanation for a negative association between performance pay and e¤ort. If there is a probability v 2 (0; 1) that an incentive contract is enforced, and this probability is treated as a variable rather than as a …xed parameter, then higher monetary rewards in the incentive contract may be associated with a lower probability of enforcement.
This may lead to reduced e¤ort.
We concentrate on informal contract enforcement. Informal enforcement is often modelled as a repeated game where contract breach is punished, not by the court, but by the contracting parties themselves who can refuse to cooperate or trade with each other after a deviation. But informal enforcement can also be due to moral or social commitment. Greif (1994) de…nes moral enforcement as enforcement based on the tendency of humans to derive utility from acting according to their values, while social enforcement is related to social sanctions. In this paper, we assume that contracts are not enforceable by the court of law, but that there is a probability v 2 (0; 1) that the principal feels morally or socially committed to honor the contract. Moreover, we assume that the principal learns whether or not she will actually honor the contract after the contract is o¤ered. There are two possible justi…cations for this. One is that the principal may learn ex post about the contractual environment, for instance to which extent social or reputational concerns matter for the given contractual relationship. Another possibility is that the principal learns about her own type after observing her own contract o¤er and the agent's actions. Now, why should improved enforcement, i.e. higher probability that the principal honors the contract, lead to lower-powered incentive contracts? At the outset one might expect the opposite. No incentive contract can be implemented in a situation where the principal certainly won't pay. And high-powered incentives can certainly be enforced if the contract is honored for sure. Also, risk aversion on the part of the agent can make it quite costly for the principal to o¤er incentives where very high bonuses are paid with low probability, as the agent must be compensated for the high risk associated with such schemes. However, it turns out that on the margin, the incentive intensity of the contract can be negatively related to the probability of enforcement under quite standard assumptions.
We show this in a simple moral hazard model where a principal must provide an agent with incentives to exert e¤ort, and where the incentive contract is honored with a probability v. We deduce the optimal incentive contract and study how exogenous variations in v a¤ect incentive provision. Exogenous variations in informal contract enforcement occur across countries and industries, but can also a¤ect a given contractual relationship via organizational or institutional reforms. Both the environments for reputational enforcement, and the conditions for social and moral commitment may vary.
As an example of the latter, it is shown in several experiments that communication facilitates trust and trustworthiness. Holmström 1979) , and show that when enforcement is probabilistic, then under certain conditions contractual incentive intensity and e¤ort are negatively related. We then show that a similar result can also be obtained under risk neutrality and limited liability. This negative relationship is a "false crowding out e¤ect" since total monetary incentives, which is the product of the enforcement probability and contractual incentives, is positively related to e¤ort. But since the enforcement probability does not show up in the incentive contract, it appears that incentives and e¤ort are negatively related.
To see the intuition, note that if the enforcement probability increases, this has a positive e¤ect on e¤ort, but it also increases expected wage costs per unit of e¤ort since the probability that the principal actually has to pay as promised increases. In order to reduce wage costs, the principal can simply reduce expected contractual wage payments. Hence, e¤ort increases, but the contractual incentives are lower-powered. And the other way around: Weaker enforcement induces lower e¤ort since the probability that the agent actually is paid decreases. In order to mitigate the reduction in e¤ort, the principal can thus provide higher-powered incentives.
This result has an important empirical implication: When observing a negative relationship between performance pay and e¤ort, one has to control for the probability that incentive contracts are actually honored. If not, one may wrongfully infer that monetary incentives crowd out non-monetary motivation. Controlling for enforcement probability is quite easy in experimental work. 2 In empirical work, however, this is much more of a challenge. Take
New Public Management (NPM) as an example. As noted, many scholars argue that NPM undermines intrinsically motivated e¤ort. But if NPM actually undermines e¤ort (which of course is debatable, see Stazyk, 2010) , would this necessarily come from crowding out of intrinsic motivation? Important aims of NPM include decentralization of management authority, more discretion and ‡exibility, less bureaucracy and less rules. These institutional changes may a¤ect both the legal and the informal enforcement environment. The crux is that enforcement and contractual incentives may be substitutes. In that sense our paper is related to models showing the substitutability between explicit contracts and informal relational contracts (see Baker, Gibbons and Murphy, 1994, and Schmidt and Schnitzer, 1995) . In these models, improved explicit contracts may reduce feasible incentive pay under relational contracting, but e¤ort is still positively related to the sum of contractual incentives. In contrast, we …nd that e¤ort may be negatively related to contractual incentives.
With respect to the modelling, a contribution of the paper is to consider probabilistic enforcement in an otherwise standard moral hazard model with risk aversion or limited liability. In the classic moral hazard models (e.g. Holmström, 1979) , perfect enforcement is assumed, while in models of incomplete contracting, it is commonly assumed that contracting is prohibitively costly so that legal enforcement is impossible (starting with Grossman and Hart, 1986) . 3 The way we model probabilistic enforcement is also novel. We adopt the general idea from the incomplete contracting literature that necessary information is realized ex post. In the seminal papers by Grossman and Hart (1986) and Hart and More (1990), the principal (buyer) learns about her needs ex post. In our setting, the principal learns about the contractual environment or her own type ex post. 4 The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we present the basic model. In Section 3 we study variations in enforcement probability under risk aversion and limited liability, respectively. Section 4 concludes.
Model
We consider a relationship between a principal and an agent, where the agent produces output x for the principal. Output is a random variable (x 2 X), and the agent's e¤ort a a¤ects the probability distribution (density) f (x; a). E¤ort costs are given by C(a), where C 0 (a) > 0, C 00 (a) > 0, C(0) = 0. We assume that output is observable to both parties, but that the agent's e¤ort level is unobservable to the principal, so the parties must contract on output: the principal pays a wage w(x) = s + (x) where s is a non-contingent …xed salary and (x) is a contingent bonus ( (x) < 0 implies a contingent …ne). We assume that the principal is risk neutral, but allow the agent to be risk averse, with a utility function u(w):
We assume that contracts are not enforceable by the court of law, but that there is a probability v 2 (0; 1) that the principal feels (morally or socially) committed to honor the contract. Consider then the following stage game :
1. The principal o¤ers a contract w(x) = s + (x) to the agent. If the agent rejects the o¤er, the game ends. If he accepts, the game continues to stage 2.
2. The agent takes action a and realizes output x.
3. Nature draws. With probability v the principal …nds herself committed to pay the bonus (x).
4. The principal observes x, pays s and chooses bonus payment~ (x) = (x) if she is committed to honor the contract, and~ (x) = 0 if not.
A crucial assumption here is that the principal learns whether or not she will actually honor the contract after the contract is o¤ered. As noted, there are two possible justi…cations for this. One is that the principal may learn about the contractual environment in stage 3, for instance to which extent social or reputational concerns matter for the given contractual relationship. Another possibility is that there are two types of principals, one that honors and one that reneges on promises, and the principal learns about her own type in stage 3 of the game.
Incentives and enforceability
We will now deduce the optimal contract and discuss variations in enforcement probability v. We will …rst assume that the agent is risk averse. We will then analyze the case where both parties are risk neutral but subject to limited liability.
Risk aversion
In stage 2 the game , the agent chooses e¤ort to maximize his expected utility, given by
(Unless otherwise noted, all integrals are over the support X.) For each outcome x, the agent gets the payment w(x) = s + (x) with probability v, and the payment (…xed salary) s otherwise, and this gives expected utility as speci…ed. Optimal e¤ort satis…es
(We will invoke assumptions to make the '…rst-order approach'valid.) In stage 1 the principal chooses wages (and e¤ort a) to maximize her payo¤, subject to the agent's choice, represented by IC, and the agent's participation constraint:
The principal, assumed risk neutral, has payo¤
Forming the Lagrangian L = V + (U U o ) + U a , with multipliers and on the IR and IC constraints, respectively, one sees that optimal payments satisfy
These conditions are standard (Holmström 79) , and re ‡ect the trade-o¤ between providing insurance and incentives for the agent. This trade o¤ is relevant for the performance dependent bonuses, but not for the …xed pay-ment s. Given a monotone likelihood ratio fa(x;a) f (x;a) (MLRP), payments w(x) will be increasing in output x.
Payments will be chosen to implement the action that is optimal for the principal, and this entails an action that satis…es L a = 0. The optimal action and the associated payments (and multipliers) will depend on the parameter v, i.e. on the level of enforceability.
We now ask, i) will e¤ort increase when the enforcement probability v increases and ii) may contractual incentives at the same time become weaker? That is: would the new contractual incentives (corresponding to the higher v) have induced lower e¤ort under the old v? If so, the new contractual incentives are weaker, but the associated e¤ort will be higher.
Consider the agent's (marginal) incentives for e¤ort; they are given by vm(a; w), where
Thus m(a; w) is the marginal incentive for e¤ort generated by the contract w(x) = s + (x). We call m the marginal contractual incentives. Consider nowṽ > v, and suppose the associated optimal e¤orts satisfỹ a > a. A way to interpret question ii) is then to ask whether m(a;w) < m(a; w), i.e. whether the monetary paymentsw associated with the higher v yield in isolation lower marginal incentives for the agent. Now, optimal e¤ort and payments are functions of v, say a(v) and (with some abuse of notation) w(v), respectively. We thus ask if m(a; w(v)) is decreasing in v, i.e. if
Note that in equilibrium the agent's choice of e¤ort will be a = a(v), and hence we have from incentive compatibility (IC) that vm(a(v); w(v)) = C 0 (a(v)). Di¤erentiating this identity we see that for equilibrium e¤ort a = a(v) we have
From this it follows that if a 0 (v) > 0 (so e¤ort increases with v), and the last term dominates the other terms on the RHS (so @ @v m < 0), then it will be the case that e¤ort and marginal contractual incentives for e¤ort move in opposite directions. 5 We will in the following provide a speci…cation of functional forms where this is precisely the case. Note from (1) and IC (vm = C 0 ) that the sign of @ @v m is given by the sign of
Hence the sign is determined by the magnitudes of three elasticities; pertaining to marginal costs, marginal contractual incentives and equilibrium e¤ort, respectively. Signing expressions like (1) thus requires properties of equilibrium e¤ort variations in a moral hazard model. To make this tractable we consider speci…c functional forms. Assume the following speci…cations for the probability distribution and for the agent's utility:
Here the expected output is Ex = a, so higher e¤ort increases expected output and leads to a more favorable distribution in the sense of …rst order stochastic dominance. The distribution satis…es MLRP. The utility function implies constant relative risk aversion ( wu 00 =u 0 = const).
It turns out that the marginal contractual incentives for e¤ort in this case are constant and independent of e¤ort, i.e. (1) 5 If on the other hand a 0 (v) < 0, then (since the square bracket in (1) is positive by the agent's SOC), we will have @m=@v < 0, and thus e¤ort and marginal contractual incentives moving in the same direction.
we have here (for a = a(v))
Hence we see that if the equilibrium marginal cost C 0 (a(v)) is inelastic (as a function of v) then marginal contractual incentives will be reduced as the level of enforceability v increases. If at the same time e¤ort increases with higher v, then clearly e¤ort and contractual incentives will move in opposite directions. It can be shown (see the appendix) that this will indeed be the case if the cost function exhibits inelastic marginal costs (aC 00 (a)=C 0 (a) 1) and moreover The intuition is as follows. Improved enforceability increases the agent's incentives to exert e¤ort (other things equal), but it also increases the principal's wage costs per unit of e¤ort (since the probability that the principal actually has to pay as promised increases). Now, even though the principal …nds it optimal to induce higher e¤ort when v increases, she will make a trade-o¤ between the bene…ts from higher e¤ort and the expected wage costs from higher v: She may thus reduce these wage costs by providing lowerpowered incentives. In other words, improved enforcement may crowd out contractual incentives.
Note that this type of crowding out appears when e¤ort costs are inelastic, meaning that the agent has a high responsiveness to incentives. The reason is that improved enforcement increases e¤ort and thus wage costs per unit e¤ort to such an extent that the principal …nds it optimal to reduce contractual incentives.
Limited liability
We will now show that similar results can be obtained under risk neutrality and limited liability. We assume from now on that the agent is risk neutral in the sense that u(w) = w, but that he is protected by limited liability so that w(x) 0. We also assume that the principal has limited means so that
x. Hence, it is assumed that the principal cannot commit to pay wages above the agent's value added. This constraint resembles Innes (1990) who in a …nancial contracting setting assumes that the investor's (principal's) liability is limited to her investment in the agent. Finally, it is convenient here to specify that output has support X = [x; x] Now, the game proceeds as in the previous section, but under risk neutrality, the agent's expected payo¤ is simply: s + R x x v (x)f (x; a)dx C(a), yielding a …rst order condition for e¤ort as follows:
In stage 1, the principal maximizes her payo¤, which is
subject to incentive (IC'), participation (IR) and limited liability constraints:
Mainly to simplify notation, we will assume x = 0 and hence that the …xed salary must be s = 0. By the same argument as in Innes (1990) , it then follows that the optimal wage scheme pays the minimal wage for outcomes below some threshold, and the maximal wage for outcomes above that threshold ( (x) = 0 for x < x 0 0 and (x) = x for x > x 0 0 ). It is well known that the discontinuity of this scheme is problematic, and for that reason one requires continuity and monotonicity. The optimal such scheme also has a threshold (say x 0 ) and pays (x) = 0 for x x 0 and (x) = x x 0 for x > x 0 : In the following we will focus on this kind of (constrained optimal) incentive scheme. Since the expected marginal payo¤ from exerting extra e¤ort is zero as long as output is below x 0 , it is clear that the higher is the threshold x 0 , the lower is the incentive intensity of the contract.
Given that the principal cannot extract rent from the agent through the …xed salary component, the IR constraint will not bind unless the agent's reservation utility U o is 'large'. Mainly to simplify notation we will assume here that U o = 0 and hence that this constraint is not binding.
Given the form of the incentive scheme, the expected payment for the agent is now
where the expression in the last integral follows from integration by parts, and where G(x; a) = Pr(outcome > xj a) = 1 F (x; a). By a similar calculation the principal's expected payo¤ can be written as
The principal's problem is now (for a given v) to choose x 0 ; a to maximize this payo¤ subject to the agent's incentive constraint.
We will focus on cases where higher v is valuable for the principal. 6 Note that a higher v is bene…cial for the principal because it strengthens the agent's incentives, but is on the other hand costly because it increases the total expected payments (and therefore the rent) to the agent. It turns out that a higher v is valuable if G a (x; a) > 0, meaning that more e¤ort yields a shift to a distribution that is more favorable in the sense of …rst order stochastic dominance. As is well known 
As noted before, a improved enforcement increases the agent's incentives to exert e¤ort (other things equal), but it also increases the principal's wage costs per unit of e¤ort. The proposition gives conditions under which the …rst e¤ect dominates in the sense that the principal …nds it optimal to induce higher e¤ort when enforceability increases. But the principal may still want to mitigate the latter e¤ect, that is to reduce wage costs by providing lowerpowered incentives. The next result shows that this is indeed what will occur, under some conditions. The following conditions turn out to be su¢ cient:
Proposition 2 Suppose that C 000 (a) 0 and that G(x; a) in addition to the assumptions in Lemma 1 satis…es (7). Then both e¤ort and the threshold investments (say K(v)) in better contract speci…cations or performance metrics, we will have @L=@v = K 0 (v) in optimum and thus @L=@v > 0 for the relevant level v.
for the incentive scheme increase with higher enforceability (a 0 (v) > 0 and x 0 0 (v) > 0), hence higher e¤ort is then associated with lower-powered contractual incentives.
An example that satis…es all assumptions is G(x; a) = Pr(outcome > x) = 1 x a , 0 x 1, (see the appendix).
The proposition demonstrates that higher e¤ort may be associated with lower-powered contractual incentives (higher x 0 ), and the other way around, even if there is no motivation-crowding-out.
Concluding remarks
We o¤er a simple model where contractual monetary incentives and e¤ort are negatively related even if there is no crowding out of non-monetary motivation. The idea is simple: Improved enforcement induces higher e¤ort, but increases the principal's expected wage costs, which can be mitigated by lower-powered incentives. Or: Weaker enforcement induces lower e¤ort, which can be mitigated by higher-powered incentives.
Our model is not an alternative to the behavioral models on crowding out, but a complement. In contrast to (parts of) the crowding out literature, we do not o¤er a negative causal relationship between incentives and e¤ort. Instead we identify a spurious relationship where improved contract enforcement increases e¤ort but "crowd out" contractual incentives. Total monetary incentives, which is the product of the enforcement probability and contractual incentives, are positively related to e¤ort, but since the enforcement probability does not show up in the incentive contract, it appears that incentives and e¤ort are negatively related. The empirical implication is clear: When observing a negative relationship between performance pay and e¤ort, one has to control for the probability that the relevant incentive contracts are actually enforced. If not, one may wrongfully infer that monetary incentives crowd out non-monetary motivation.
Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1. From the Lagrangian L = V + (U U o ) + U a , we obtain the following conditions for optimal bonuses (x), or equivalently payments
and for the optimal …xed payment s:
The …rst is equivalent to
, and substituting from the …rst into the second we get u 0 = 1. This proves (W).
For utility u(w) = p w we have 1=u 0 = 2u, hence the conditions for optimal payments are
where h(x; a) = fa(x;a) f (x;a) denotes the likelihood ratio. Proposition 1 now follows from the lemma below. To state the lemma de…ne
De…ne also
Then we have (12) below holds, then @m @v < 0.
As we will show below, the LHS of (12) coincides with (2) . Consider now Proposition 1. For F (x; a) = 1 e x=a it is straightforward to verify (see below) that we have M (a) = 1=a 2 , M 1 (a) = 0, N (a) = 2=a 3 and R xf a (x; a)dx = 1, and hence that
For this distribution, condition (12) in the lemma is thus
Since p 0 (a) > 0, we see that for inelastic marginal costs this condition holds if q(a) aq 0 (a). This holds if
Proof of the lemma. Consider …rst the agent's marginal contractual incentive m(a; w), where payments w() are optimal, and thus given by (8) for the optimal action a = a , say. We then have
where M (a; a ) is (with a slight abuse of notation) de…ned by the identity, and the third equality follows from R f a = 0 (since R f = 1). Note that the agent's choice problem is concave if vm a (a; w) C 00 (a) 0, which holds if M a (a; a ) 0 and C 00 0, and that the optimal choice of e¤ort is then given by the FOC vm(a; w) = C 0 (a). In equilibrium we have a = a and thus
Note also from IR (which will be binding) and (8) that we have
where the last equality follows from the fact that
To characterize the optimal e¤ort for the principal, consider
where we have de…ned e(a) = R xf a (x; a)dx as the marginal value of e¤ort on output.
Consider the second term in (17) . Since u = p w we have w = u 2 , and substituting from (8) we can write
where the last equality follows from R f a = 0 and the de…nitions of M (a) and N (a), see (9) and (11) .
We see from (13) and (10) that we (in equilibrium) have m a (a; w) = M 1 (a) =2 and hence that (17) can be written as
Substituting for from (15) and for from (16) we obtain the following condition for optimal e¤ort
where the last equality follows from the de…nitions of p(a); q(a) and e(a) = R xf a . This shows that optimal e¤ort is given by p(a) + q(a) (14) and (9)- (10)) that m a =m = M 1 (a)=M (a), we see that condition (2) is equivalent to (12) in the lemma. This completes the proof.
For completeness we …nally verify the assertions stated above regarding the distribution F (x; a) = 1 e x=a . We have here density f (x; a) = 
This shows that M (a) = M (a; a) = 1=a 2 and M 1 (a) = M a (a; a = a) = 0.
We further have
Finally note that q(a) = 2a (a), with (a) = (C 0 ) 2 + aC 00 C 0 and hence
3. This veri…es the stated assertions.
Remark. As another application of the Lemma, one can show that e¤ort and contractual incentives move in opposite directions (a 0 (v) > 0; 
= 2ak 2 and p(a) = 2(U o + ka)k 1 (a+1) 2 , and thus h
This shows that the condition in the Lemma is ful…lled for v close to 1.
Proof of Lemma 1
The principal chooses x 0 ; a to maximize her payo¤ (5) subject to the agent's incentive constraint, which here takes the form
The Lagrangian for this problem is
As noted we focus on cases where higher v is valuable for the principal, i.e. where and hence the standard comparative statics formulae
From FOC we have 0 = L x 0 = vG(x 0 ; a) vG a (x 0 ; a) and hence
Hence we can write G aa (x; a)dx < 0, and hence from (26) that H a H x 0 L av < 0. We then have from (24):
G aa (x; a)dx by (26) , and since G aa < 0 implies L ax 0 = vG a (x 0 ; a) vG aa (x 0 ; a) > 0, we have Hence from (29) we now have
